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FOREWORD

The authors of this work argue by means of Fourth Epoch War theory that the introduction of nonlethal technology on the battlefield will be as significant as the introduction
of gunpowder during the European Renaissance. If these authors are accurate in this
projection, it will mean that the Army, within the context afForce XXI, will be required
to cope with both an entirely new concept of politico-military force and the emerging
ethical debate which will surround its development.
Recent events appear to support this contention. Disclosures concerning the Iraqi
biological program confirm agents were being specifically developed to seriously incapacitate opposing troops, rather than kill them, in order to place a greater logistical strain
on Western forces. Closer to home, Secretary ofDefense William J. Perry has announced
that the Department of Defense prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause
permanent blindness of unenhanced vision. This has resulted in the Army's being ordered to discontinue its AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasures System program whose
M-16 rifle-mounted laser weapon is designed to be used against the optical sights of
enemy armored vehicles, which may incidentally have such blinding effects.
Because this Land Warfare Paper raises many important implications and fundamental questions concerning nonlethal technology and its relationship to Force XXI, we offer
it as a vehicle toward new avenues of professional military debate.
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JACK N. MERRITT
General, U.S. Army Retired
President

February 1996

Nonlethal Technology and Fourth Epoch War:
A New Paradigm of Politico-Military Force

Introduction
How politico-military force will be employed in future war is of major concern to
U.S. national security and, because of its operational leadership in this area, to the Army's
Force XXI campaign plan. It is envisioned that such force will qualitatively change
because of the introduction of advanced technology. This technology will extend the
West's continuing mastery of the application of political violence. No longer in war will
the West have the capability solely to kill; now, like a martial arts master, it will be able to
rely upon nonlethal means to disarm an opponent. 1 As a result, an effective national
policy to deal with the appropriate employment of technologically advanced politicomilitary force will become a challenge of the first magnitude. How our policy makes use
of this new method of waging war has far-reaching and potentially dangerous national
security implications.
Until recently, nonlethal technologies have existed in "black" (i.e., classified) programs with little information being made public. 2 With more information being released
as funding for a number of these programs becomes imminent, their potential impact is
becoming apparent. 3 The vast potential that nonlethal technologies provide has already
been recognized by visionary military scholars. Col. John A. Warden III, USAF, in a
recent briefing concerning "Non Lethal Concepts of Operation," stated that:
Non lethal technologies do not appear to be merely tactical tools with limited utility;
rather, they appear to be strategic and operational level technologies which give us
powerful new concepts of operation which can allow us to achieve political and military objectives in ways not previously possible.4
Russian military experts, whose Soviet predecessors were the first to recognize the
military technical revolution (MTR) or what in the West is called the revolution in military
affairs (RMA), also "view nontraditional weapons a~ the next stage in the ongoing MTR.
They continue to examine the roles of air-, sea-, and space-based directed-energy weapons, as well as the role of systems termed nonlethal in the West." 5

It is this potential that nonlethal technologies offer, how they will influence the American
use of politico-military force in the 21st century, the policy surrounding the use of this
force, and the fundamental concerns that such a trend projection raises that will be discussed in this essay.

Trend Projection
The incorporation of nonlethal technologies by our armed services is envisioned to
result in the development of dual-capability lethal- and nonlethal-based warfare during
the transition period to Fourth Epoch War. 6 The basic principle behind the epochs of war
is the profound impact the energy foundations ofWestem civilization have exerted on its
military and social organization. The First Epoch was based on human energy, the Second Epoch on animal energy and the Third Epoch on mechanical energy. The emerging
Fourth Epoch w ill be based upon a postmechanical energy foundation.
While the three earlier epochs were based solely upon the use of lethal force, the
emerging Fourth Epoch will see an expansion of the concept of coercive force. The
nonlethal capabi lity which is now developing will continue to grow in importance until it
surpasses lethality-based warfare as the preferred means of conducting war in the West.
This will take place because the politico-military value of this emerging nonlethal force
capability will ultimately be viewed in the decades to come as superior to a lethal capability toward the furtherance of national security policy for three primary reasons:
Fewer political objections result from the application of nonlethal force as opposed to
the application oflethal force.7
•

Disabling an opponent is more efficient than killing an opponent.
Precision over politico-military force application allows an entire spectrum of responses which can be brought to bear in a conflict scenario.

The first point is a by-product of the global news media broadcast trend, the "CNN
effect," which has developed. 8 It represents a major component in the shift in American
society which has resulted in a public no longer willing to accept the loss of American
lives, or for that matter the lives of indigenous peoples, in foreign military operations
except in "just war" circumstances. 9
Domestically, many of our American city cores are beginning to resemble Third World
environments where the rule of law requires restoration at least periodically by force
(e.g., the Los Angeles riots); nonlethal means will also become increasingly relied upon
in these circumstances to help restore order. This is a trend which is intensified by the
negative public opinion concerning the use of deadly force on American citizenry - even
more so than on foreign populations.
It is envisioned that this operational constraint on the use oflethal force will dominate
politico-military concerns over the next decade or two. U ltimately, the use of nonlethal
force to achieve national security policy goals will be viewed as superior to lethal force in
some situations because its use will be less apt to be challenged by public opinion. This
potentiality is actively influencing the Department of Defense which, under the lead of
Charles F. Swett, Assistant for Strategic Assessment, is currently in the process of for-
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mulating "policies and procedures governing the role of nonlethal weapons in U.S. national security, their acquisition, and employment." 10 The working defmition of these
weapons is as follows:
Non-lethal weapons are discriminate weapons that are explicitly designed and employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities and
undesired damage to property and the environment.
Unlike weapons that permanently destroy targets through blast, fragmentation or penetration, nonlethal weapons have relatively reversible effects on targets and/or are
able to discriminate between targets and non-targets in the weapon' s area of impact. 11
This emerging policy will probably explicitly ban funding for nonlethal weapons which
do not satisfy a number of criteria. The most relevant of these criteria, for our purposes,
is the one requiring nonlethal weaponry to "have an acceptably low probability of being
fatal or inflicting permanent disablement on personnel, and causing undesired damage to
property and the environment." 12
The second of the three points may become even more important than the first within
the very near future. It is based on the idea that the long-term disablement of an opponent
is far more efficient than the killing of an opponent. Disablement creates a greater burden
(economic, social, psychological, political, etc.) on the opposing political grouping (nation-state, subnational group, mob, etc.) than does the death of one of its members.
Such a perception is at odds with modem Western ideas governing the conduct of
war (e.g., the Department of Defense policy draft on nonlethal weapons) and current
arms control treaties. Soviet military experts who have analyzed the role of advanced
technologies in the GulfWar as a prototype of future war, however, have already reached
the conclusion that "the GulfWar demonstrated that a qualitative future has replaced the
quantitative past of warfare. And the heart of current arms control treaties is said to
belong to that past." 13 Because the potential that new technologies offer is not being
constrained by old ideas governing their use in the Russian successor state, and undoubtedly in many non-Western states and subnational groups who do not share current Westem moral inhibitions, we have decided to give serious consideration to this politico-military force path in our trend projection.
The third and final point is based on the great utility offered by the tailored application
of political violence. Killing, as previously mentioned, is not always the most efficient
application of coercive force. Based on the differing needs of military (foreign) and
police (domestic) force requirements, it is thought that two divergent, yet integrated,
threads of nonlethal weaponry will develop:
•

short-term incapacitation (physical-mentaVperceptual disruption);

•

long-term incapacitation (physical-mental/perceptual disruption).
3

These threads will be combined with current lethal technology, and future advances in
that area, to provide three levels of politico-military force options available to American
decision-makers in the 21st century where only a lethal option existed before. Further,
these politico-military force options will be applied against both the physical and mental/
perceptual attributes of human and machine targets. (See matrix 1.) 14
These future force options will significantly influence the development offorce XXI
operational concepts. As a result, radically new post-Clausewitzian concepts of politicomilitary force application will begin to develop because, when what before appeared as
discrete and unrelated forms of warfare (e.g., information/electronic warfare, chemical
warfare, biological warfare, propaganda warfare) and advanced technologies (e.g., directed energy, acoustic projection, computer viruses, genetic engineering) are taken together, they yield a coherent vision of future warfare which has no parallel in the past.

Matrix 1
21st Century Politico-Military Force Spectrum
FORCE

HUMAN
(Physical)

HUMAN
(Mental/
Perceptual)

MACHINE
(Hardware)

MACHINE
(Software)

Short-term
Incapacitation

• Bean Bag
• Infrasonic
• Rubber
Bullet
• Sponge
Grenade
• Taser
• Tear Gas

• Directed
Light
• Hydrogen
Sulphide Gas
• Pheromonal
• Strobe Light

• Antitraction
• Carbon Fibers
• Sticky Net
• Super-adhesive

• Frequency
Jammer
• Low Voltage
• Multitasking
Virus

Long-term
Incapacitation

• Acoustic
• Laser
• Microwave
• Mustard Gas
• Radiological

• BehaviorAltering Drugs
• Genetic
Alteration
• NeuroImplant
• Propaganda

• Acetylene
Bubbles
• Anti-Material
Corrosive
• Anti-Plastic
Microbes
• Polystyrene
Pellets

• Computer
Virus
Weapon
• High
Voltage Pulse
• Sleeper
Virus

Deadly

• Artillery
Barrage
• Rifle
Round

• Death
Hologram
• Hyper Sleep
Deprivation

• Armor Piercing
• High Explosive
Antitank

• Nonnuclear
Electromagnetic
Pulse
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Two general observations can be made concerning these politico-military force options. Against an advanced technology opponent, nonlethal technology applied against
machines (specifically information machines) will probably dominate. 15 This fact already
appears well known to subnationals hostile to the West given the high numbers of computer viruses which originate in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent. For this
reason, the Pearl Harbors of the 21st century will probably occur in cyberspace (e.g., on
the Internet or in the fmancial records of a major bank) and can as easily be initiated by a
drug cartel against a nation-state as by one nation-state against another.
Against a non-Western opponent lacking advanced technology, such aS' a local warlord, nonlethal technology applied against humans will presumably dominate. In the
evacuation of United Nations forces in Somalia in late February 1995, U.S. Marines
brought with them rubber bullets, bean-bag shotguns and two kinds of sticky foam. While
only sticky foam was used to cover the fmal withdrawal, its deployment was a watershed
event, one which signifies a future dominant component in U.S. politico-military force
application in less developed countries. Further, many of these countries are becoming
increasingly urbanized and therefore pose extremely restrictive future battlefield environments for Army soldiers. Not surprisingly, given the striking combat environment parallels, the origins ofmuch ofthis technology can be directly linked to the Vietnam era when
it was developed for antipersonnel weapons. 16
Having made these general observations, the three types offorce which will exist in
the 21st century will be addressed. Their application against humans rather than against
machines will be the focus, however, because of the greater ethical implications that will
develop. Although short-term incapacitation has both domestic and foreign application,
it is its domestic application by police forces that will conceivably dominate for quite
some time. In use on American citizens, the short-term incapacitation this form of nonlethal technology allows is exactly what is required in riot and crowd control scenarios. 17
Long-term incapacitation would result in citizens who become an economic and political burden on our polity - an undesirable end - and the antithesis ofwhat our nation
stands for. This form offorce also has immense utility in foreign engagements, perhaps
predominantly so in the next couple of decades. Peacekeeping operations will continue to
be required, as will warnings to hostile polities threatening greater use of force unless
American policy dictates are complied with. 18 An example of the application of this last
form of force might be delivering of acetylene bubbles or solvent pellets via cruise missile
or artillery delivery systems, thus rendering the internal combustion engines of a tank
column of a hostile nation inert at the border of the country it is intent on seizing. 19
Additionally, long-term incapacitation technology would be used against certain hostile forces abroad because it creates a burden for the opposing polity far out of proportion
to that of the use oflethal force. It is commonly accepted on the battlefield that nonlethal
casualties remove multiple soldiers from combat and place greater strain on the
sustainability of an armed force than do fatalities. The potential ofthis form of force is
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apparent, however, when taken to a macro-level of abstraction, resulting from a conscious policy on the part ofUnited States' or other countries' armed forces to inflict longterm incapacitating, instead of lethal, wounds on opposing combatants.
Deadly force, the third component of the envisioned 21st century politico-military
force spectrum, is the traditional form of force used in the Western conduct of war and in
domestic law enforcement since no precision has existed over the control of political
violence. In the future, when the application of nonlethal force is available but not sufficient to induce compliance, lethal force will still be an option of last resort. In other
instances, however, lethal weaponry will continue to be the initial form of force application. A danger exists in creating the expectation of "thresholds of force" which must be
followed because it would limit U.S. flexibility in its response to future international
cnses.
As a result of these politico-military developments, during the transition to Fourth
Epoch War, dual-capability weapons (i.e. , lethal and nonlethal) will begin to be fielded as
the West (and the United States in particular) begins to "work out" the application of
nonlethal technology. One such prototype weapon is the Objective Individual Combat
Weapon (OICW), the likely successor to the Ml6A2/M203 rifle/grenade launcher, which
merges a standard 5.56mm lethal kinetic-energy round capability with a 20rnm drum
which can be filled with either high explosive- (HE) or soft-drag grenades laden with tear
gas (CS) or marking dye for crowd control purposes. (See figure 1.) 20

Figure 1
Second Generation OICW Mockup 21

1111 II
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Even more advanced prototypes ofthese weapons are beginning to exploitnonenginebased forms of energy. Some explanation, at this point, is required. A modem assault
rifle is essentially an engine-based system. It mimics an engine in that each bullet represents a one-way piston which is ejected after each internal combustion takes place. For
low-energy lasers, holographic projectors, high-power acoustics and other advanced devices to be fielded, more powerful energy sources beyond engine-based forms are ultimately required. 22
The movement toward nonengine-based forms is a critical development because it
represents an integral aspect ofFourth Epoch War theory which forecasts the future fielding of qualitatively advanced military weaponry as one attribute of the energy paradigm
shift between the Modem and the Post-Modem worlds. As a result of this energy shift,
weapons such as "brilliant laser rifles" will ultimately be fielded in the decades to come
with variable intensity settings to allow them the capacity of being used across the politico-military force spectrum.

Fundamental Concerns

The projected trends regarding the massive impact ofnonlethal technology on the use
ofAmerican politico-military force in the 21st century raises three fundamental concerns.
The first concern, which deals with methodology, is that the importance of nonlethal
technology may just be a mythical "silver bullet." Such a concern results from the revolution in military affairs (RMA) having heretofore been defined solely as a "technical
legacy" to the exclusion of other critical issues such as "purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation and organizational adaptation. "23 This projection, however, not only
acknowledges the existence of such idea-based concerns, but is founded on the premise
that ideas form half of the synthesis, along with technology, required for qualitative military change. 24
The three energy epochs ofWestem civilization and a fourth emerging one isolated in
earlier work support such a premise. The First Epoch represents the Classical age when
human energy dominated military organization, as witnessed by the development of the
phalanx and the legion, and the economy which was based on slave-holding. The Second
Epoch represents the Medieval world when animal energy dominated military and economic organization. Cavalry dominated the feudal array and oxen and horses represented
the chief motive source of an economy based on fief-holding. The Third Epoch represents the Modem world when mechanical energy based on machine, later engine forms,
dominated military and economic organization. Varying forms of artillery (broadly defined) dominated the conduct ofwar while mercantilism, and later capitalism, became the
basis of economic production. The emerging Fourth Epoch represents a Post-Modem
world based on postmechanical forms of energy, resulting in the development of qualitatively new forms of military, economic and social organization.
7

Each of the three earlier epochs witnessed one or more energy sequences developing.
An energy sequence is based first on the experimental exploitation, and later institutionalization, of a specific form of energy. The emergence of the Fourth Epoch means that an
experimental era is now being entered. This era has great similarities to the European
Renaissance, which is generally accepted as a period of historical transition, because it
witnessed the emergence of the arquebus, a form of technology which also represented
an experimental era of energy source exploitation.
This projection recognizes that the body of competing technologies that nonlethal
weaponry represents greatly parallels the fielding of the arquebus. Because the technology embodied in the arquebus was so qualitatively advanced and misunderstood by the
dominant knightly culture of the era, attempts were made to ban its introduction on the
battlefield. Ultimately, however, the technology the arquebus introduced on the battlefield vis-a-vis preexisting weapons
was shown to have far wider application: that is, it displayed more promise. The
concept of promise can be understood if we consider the decision to abandon the
longbow and crossbow in favor of the arquebus. A comparison between the three
would show that the longbow was a relatively easy weapon to manufacture but required extensive training in its use. The crossbow, on the other hand, was difficult to
manufacture but easier to train a soldier to use. The arquebus combined the worst of
both systems. It was difficult and costly to manufacture, and required a lengthy
period of training in the complexities of its use. Yet the two forms of the bow had
exhausted their potential; the energy they employed had reached the limit of its efficient use in that form. The arquebus, primitive though it was, could be seen to have
great developmental potential; no such potential could be envisioned for either longbow
or crossbow. 25
The multitude of competing nonlethal technologies which now exist are based on a
wide range of kinetic, electric and chemical forms, according to Dr. Edward P. Scannell,
a leading expert in this field ofstudy. 26 We, however, expand this concept and take the
position that far more nonlethal technology forms, not traditionally defmed as such by the
military services, exist. These include, but are not limited to, propaganda/psychological,
informational and biotechnological forms usually considered to provide the basis for other
separate and distinct types of warfare. (Refer back to matrix 1.)
This proliferation of nonlethal weaponry, also qualitatively advanced and misunderstood by the dominant military culture of our era, has parallels in the earlier epochal shift
(between energy paradigms) which took place between the Second and Third epochs.
The European conduct ofwar during the centuries prior to 1500 was fragmented in nature because it reflected the regional forms of warfare that bad developed. These local
forms ofwarfare exploited competing forms of mechanical-based weaponry and competing ideas concerning how they should be fielded. It was not until the stunning French
invasion ofltaly in 1494 under Charles VIII's army which " mixed these weapon systems
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and tactical perspectives" that a Europe-wide form of warfare began to developY Because of the significant historical precedents, we are confident that the projection concerning the profound importance of nonlethal technology is reasonably accurate. In fact,
it can be said that the introduction of nonlethal technology on the battlefield will be as
significant as the introduction of gunpowder during the European Renaissance.
The second fundamental concern focuses on the synergistic effect resulting from the
interaction of nonlethal technology, recognized as only one developmental thread of advanced technology warfare, with other emerging future trends. The parable of the blind
men and the elephant is a useful conceptual tool to introduce at this point. Many military
and academic scholars are now engaged in defining what the RMA "elephant" will look
like when it matures. Like the blind men of the parable, each scholar seems, in general,
able to focus on only one major aspect of this as yet unrecognizable creature. Arquilla
and Ronfeldt (Cyber War), the Tofflers (Third Wave War), de Caro (Soft War) and others
focus on the information/electronic aspect of the RMA. 28 Metz and Kievit argue that the
biotechnological aspects of this creature "including genetic engineering and advanced
behavior-altering drugs" may potentially be more profound. 29 De Landa (Robots) and
Anderberg and Wolbarsht (Lasers) focus on still other aspects of the RMA. 30 To add to
this confusion, Lind et al. (Fourth Generation Warfare), van Creveld (Non-Trinitarian
War) and Huntington (Cultural War) focus on the rise of very credible non-Western threats
which can be likened to an anti-RMA "mouse."31
Information/electronic, biotechnology and robotic developments will have profound
nonlethal politico-military force applications. 32 Less exotic applications such as computer viruses, electronic jamming operations, media broadcasts and carbon fiber-filled
Tomahawk missiles (launched against Iraqi power plants during the Gulf War) have already been recognized. 33 More esoteric applications could include the deployment of
static and mobile machine soldiers which dispense sleeping gasses for crowd control
purposes, nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse (NNEMP) generators or CoI. Warden's envisioned "holographic prophet" projected over a hostile capital whose radio and television broadcasts have been seized and are being used against it. 34
The value of recognizing the contribution each group of scholars provides concerning
this "elephant" and its "mouse" sidekick is apparent. The advanced technology thread
spotlighted in this essay will impact these other trends while at the same time being
influenced by them. The approach we have taken is to focus on a broader and more
inclusive framework that accounts for both of these creatures within our energy based
paradigm.
We argue further that the foci of the various scholars can be seen as reflecting the
simultaneous nonlinear generation of attributes of epochal change between the Modern
and Post-Modern worlds in the same manner as that which took place during the Western
Renaissance five centuries ago. This is a perception currently held by relatively few
American strategic thinkers because most primarily focus only on narrow military and
geopolitical concerns.
9

The final fundamental concern raised by our projection entails the impact the incorporation of nonlethal technology will ultimately have on American political and military
institutions - though this concern should be broadened to include the incorporation of all
forms of advanced technology embodied in the RMA.

It is generally recognized that between approximately 1815 and 1830, Western historical patterns became compressed with the advent of industrialization. This has resulted in subepochal change (or change which takes place in an energy paradigm), which
once took centuries to occur, now taking a little more than a century to be completed. 35
This increasing rate of change and the fact that an epochal, rather than subepochal, shift is
taking place, increases the probability of a new national security dilemma emerging from
our nation's relationship with advanced technology. This relationship is similar to that of
humanity toward Pandora's box- a box full of unwanted evils and hope. This is not a
Luddite perception but one gained from an intimate appreciation of Western historical
and political development. 36
Additionally, the future incorporation by our nation of the politico-military force spectrum envisioned in this essay will have important and unexpected consequences. Recent
events provide early warnings for this concern. In military operations in Somalia and
Haiti where CS and pepper spray, representing short-term incapacitants, were carried by
individual soldiers, the authorization for the use of this nonlethal force had to be obtained
at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hence, the use of nonlethal force and what it
represents, both socially and politically, is already clashing with traditional ideas on how
to conduct modern military operations. Our military rules of engagement (ROE) are
becoming increasingly irrelevant to the new capabilities even these primitive forms of
nonlethal technology are posing.
Concerns over the influence the introduction of nonlethal technology will have on
lowering the threshold for the use of military power, on redefining an act of war and on
eroding soldier combat skills have also been expressed by some scholars. War may no
longer seem so repulsive as it once was and therefore we may rely upon it more often in
the pursuit of national objectives - much as we did initially in the Civil War and Vietnam
because we thought each conflict would be short and neat. Furthermore, defining an act
of war now becomes problematic. 37 Would a highly effective propaganda attack against
an opposing polity now be grounds for launching an overt military strike?
It is also envisioned that extensive reliance on nonlethal weaponry to incapacitate
enemies will have an unfortunate side effect of making it extremely difficult for our troops
to kill, even when their lives depend on it. It has been estimated that about six months of
training may be required to properly resocialize many troops into the act of killing after
relying on nonlethal weapons for prolonged periods of time.38
The implications of a conscious decision, which could come about unilaterally or far
more likely as a reaction to the policy of a hostile power, to inflict long-term incapacita-
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tion by U.S. forces on opposing combatants can thus be imagined. The problem concerning the ethics of employment will again arise. This time, however, nonlethal technology
may wel1 be considered inhurnane. 39 Many, in fact, may argue that it is more humane to
kill opposing soldiers than to purposefully implement a defense policy which seeks to
permanently blind them, disrupt their nervous systems or severely degrade their lung
capacity, while others will argue that it is better to have lost sight or lung capacity than to
be dead. 40 References to the horrors of the gassings of the First World War will undoubtedly be made. Furthermore, the potential for a new form of martyrdom based on those
living, not dead, wi!l arise.
This and other dilemmas will undoubtedly be compounded as the capacity to employ
such nonlethal force on the battlefield becomes increasingly more precise over the decades to come with the deepening mastery of America's armed forces over the conduct of
war. The capacity to precisely inflict long-term incapacitating disabilities will likely create an intense debate within our armed forces, and the nation that it mirrors, regarding the
accepted norms of conducting modern warfare.4 1 Such a debate will center on the question of whether a democratic society should be allowed to wage war in this fashion.
The effects of this one moral dilemma will be magnified ifjust a few other advanced
technology developments take place. Such developments under consideration include
the fielding of early robotic systems which are unable to take prisoners, the wearing of
battle suits which automatically inject severely wounded soldiers with adrenal hormones
and pain-suppressers to keep them in combat, and the battlefield harvesting of the organs
of fallen soldiers to save the lives of their comrades. Clearly, if enough events following
this pattern take place too rapidly, our political and military institutions have the potential
to become overwhelmed by the ethical dilemmas that will ensue. 42

Conclusion
From this nonlethal technology trend projection, including the development of the
21 st century politico-military force spectrum capability it provides, the policy questions
surrounding its use and the fundamental concerns this has spawned, it is argued that at
least two things need to occur. The first is that the revolution in military affairs (RMA)
debate within the Army needs to be broadened to incorporate a political dimension. Periods of massive military change, such as we are now entering, do not take place in a
political vacuum and for that reason the concept of a "revolution in political and military
affairs" (RPMA) needs to be developed. 43 To continue this debate only within military
parameters will result in both a myopic and inaccurate vision of the future, one which
ignores the true magnitude of the changes now occurring in our economic and societal
structures, and may lead to alienation from the broader political process and the Americanpeople.
The second is that the Army is going to have to rise above the intense rivalries that are
a function of defense reductions and the current roles and missions debate. As the recog-
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nized leader of future warfighting doctrinal innovation and institutional adaptation, it must
take the lead with government, industry and the other armed services in a new and critical
venture. This undertaking must ensure that the cutting-edge technology that is currently
being developed for military purposes, much of which is now in fact derived from commercial industry, does not unintentionally compromise national security by being too advanced for our society in general, and political and military institutions in particular, to
accommodate.
Our nation is built upon an interwoven matrix of technology and ideas. The potential
exists for this synthesis to be irrevocably shattered by the introduction of qualitatively
advanced military technology. Historical precedents exist as a basis for such concerns.44
Our government, therefore, must proceed with absolute caution when negotiating the
uncertain path we have begun. To do this, a nonpartisan governmental body must be
assembled whose function is to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy concerning
the introduction of advanced technology into our armed forces so that our national institutions do not become destabilized, while allowing our military forces to retain their technical warfighting edge.
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